Abstract: By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments, elite cooperative members, and ordinary cooperative members, and using MATLAB numerical simulations, this study explores the evolutionary paths of cooperative members’ willingness to cooperate under different internal governance mechanisms. The results show that: ① The surplus distribution mechanism significantly affects the behavior choice of elite members, and there is a critical value (0.4) in the adjustment of the earnings distribution mechanism. ② The improvement of the internal supervision and management mechanism has a significant positive incentive for the improvement of members' willingness to cooperate. ③ The trust mechanism in relational governance can reduce the cost of strategic interaction, especially when led by elite members, it is easier to promote collective action. ④ The government's external support should aim at the normative governance of cooperatives rather than focusing only on performance. Therefore, it is necessary to standardize the surplus distribution mechanism within the cooperatives, improve the supervision and management mechanism of cooperatives, make good use of the trust mechanism of relationship governance, and correctly play the role of local governments in supporting and supervising cooperatives to promote the healthy development of cooperatives.