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国家公园跨行政边界风景道外部性问题治理研究以武夷山国家公园为例

Research on the Governance of Externality Problems of scenic Byways Across Administrative Boundaries in National Parks —— The Case of Wuyishan National Park

  • 摘要: 中国的国家公园风景道作为兼具生态保护与生产经营功能的复合型载体,功能发挥不尽人意,不仅有些风景道安全事故频发,多数跨行政边界风景道难以形成统一管理、“风景”并未产生全面的效益。本文选择由政府规划建设、交通空间旅游化生产形成的武夷山国家公园1号风景道以及基于旅游轨迹自发形成的华东K2线作为典型对比案例,基于外部性理论构建国家公园风景道跨边界统一管理的分析框架,结合武夷山国家公园环带政策文件、两步路网站游记文本以及现场访谈资料进行分析。研究发现,由于“生态保护第一”原则下不同行政区的追责机制存在差异,国家公园风景道的正负外部性在不同管理者之间分布不均衡,难以实现管理者的权责利相称、难以形成与充分发挥风景道功能相称的有效激励。国家公园风景道管理问题的制度成因可概括为信息不对称和激励不相容导致负外部性难以控制、正外部性难以共享。据此提出一种可以实现激励相容的跨边界统一管理模式:对于交通空间旅游化生产形成的旅游公路,可通过不同地区政府主管部门间的标准化、一致性管理强化正外部性;对于基于旅游轨迹自发形成的游径,可依托国家公园经营性服务提供方实现跨边界统一运营并控制负外部性,使其成为国家公园风景道体系的有益补充。

     

    Abstract: China’s national park scenic byways function as composite carriers that integrate ecological protection and commercial operations. Nevertheless, these scenic byways have yet to fully play their roles. Not only do some scenic byways experience frequent safety accidents, but most scenic byways across administrative boundaries also struggle to achieve unified management, and the “scenery” has yet to produce integrated benefits. Selecting Wuyishan National Park No.1 Scenic Byway and the East China K2 Line as cases for comparison, this paper conducts a comparative case study of official scenic byways and routes spontaneously formed based on tourism tracks. From the perspective of externalities, this paper constructs a theoretical framework for the unified cross-boundary management of national park scenic byways . Drawing on textual analysis, this study finds that the positive and negative externalities of national park scenic byways are unevenly distributed among different management entities due to cross-boundary differences and the accountability mechanism under the “ecological protection first” principle. This makes it difficult to achieve alignment among authority, responsibility and interests among management entities, which also impedes the formation of an effective incentive mechanism commensurate with the functions of scenic byways. The essential cause of this governance dilemma is the difficulty of controlling negative externalities and sharing positive externalities due to information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility. On this basis, this paper explores an incentive-compatible model of unified cross-boundary management. For scenic byways formed through the tourism-oriented production of traffic space, consistent management across different governments can be adopted to strengthen positive externalities. For routes spontaneously formed based on tourism tracks, it is easier to leverage market actors by introducing franchised enterprises to achieve cross-boundary management and thereby control negative externalities, making such routes a useful supplement to the national park scenic byways system.

     

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