Abstract: The re-launch of CCER market brings new revenue channels and compliance options for power generators. In this context, an evolutionary game model of the trading decision of agroforestry biomass power generators and traditional energy power generators in the CCER market was constructed. The evolution and the influence of the key policy changes, such as the exit method of renewable energy subsidies, the fine amount of the carbon emission trading system, the proportion of renewable energy quotas, and the CCER offset ratio, on the trading decision of power generators was simulated through the system dynamics method. The research shows that: Both agroforestry biomass power generators and conventional energy generators tend to participate in CCER trading. Compared to selling green certificates, selling CCERs increases the revenues of r agroforestry biomass power generators and allows them to get rid of the negative impacts of subsidy withdrawal in earlier time. Subsidy withdrawal increases the trading willingness of agroforestry biomass power generators, and the withdrawal method of shortening the subsidy period is more conducive to increasing the profitability of agroforestry biomass power generators. Rising fines increases the willingness of traditional energy power generators to buy CCERs, but excessive fines may break the equilibrium of the CCER market. This research will contribute to the improvement of China's green certificate and CCER market convergence policy and promote the sustainable development of the agroforestry biomass power generation industry.