| Citation: |
Shi Zhenghuang, Wu Chengliang, Zhang Haokun, Tian Minghua, Hou Fangmiao. A Review of Research on "Certain Chief System" and Natural Resources Management from the Perspective of Ecological Civilization[J]. Journal of Beijing Forestry University (Social Science), 2025, 24(1): 25-32. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2023249
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The "certain chief system" is a significant institutional innovation in China's natural ecological environment sector, playing an important role in achieving the sustainable development of natural resources. This paper, from the perspective of ecological civilization, examines the origins and diffusion mechanisms of the "certain chief system" and reviews its connotations and supporting theories. It systematically analyzes the relevant literature on the governance performance of the "certain chief system" since its implementation, attempting to reveal the theoretical mechanisms and empirical outcomes of its impact on natural resources governance. The findings show that most existing studies suggest that the "certain chief system" can incentivize government actions and integrate governance resources, thereby serving as a concrete operation of China's approach to "mobilizing resources to accomplish significant tasks", which helps improve natural resources governance performance. However, since the "certain chief system" fundamentally involves constraining governance responsibility entities, its governance effects vary across regions. Excessive horizontal policy innovations could distract government attention and increase regulatory costs, making it difficult for the system to become a long-term, one-size-fits-all solution for natural resources governance in China. In the future, research on the "certain chief system" needs to focus on longer policy cycles and explore governance approaches and pathways under the coexistence of various "certain chief system" policies, based on policy effects and grassroots governance realities. The government should also reduce the burden on grassroots levels and avoid unrestricted horizontal policy innovations under the "certain chief system".
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