Abstract: “What to do about individual households?” is a new issue that emerged after the reform of collective forest tenure system. After the rights were assigned to individual households, the resources became highly dispersed, and farmers faced problems such as high operating costs, low operational efficiency, poor transaction flow, and narrow financing channels. This paper takes the “Forest Eco-Bank” model in Nanping City as the research object and deeply analyzes the mechanism of this model in solving the problem of “individual households”. The study finds that the “guaranteed minimum income + floating share” stepped contract design of the “Forest Eco-Bank” demonstrates the functions of a price benchmark and an efficiency selector. Its professional operation capabilities and the positioning of “guarantee” have played the functions of transaction matching and credit endorsement among farmers, social capital, and commercial banks. These four functions break through the simple large-scale thinking of “transferring - centralized management”, and build a collaborative governance structure of “government guidance - professional operation - market participation – farmers benefit”, attracting multiple parties to participate and jointly promoting the realization of forest ecosystem products value.