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于丹, 王斯一, 张彩虹, 张兰. 电厂和政府行为策略演化博弈与仿真研究基于农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展视角[J]. 北京林业大学学报(社会科学版), 2024, 23(1): 62-70. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2022172
引用本文: 于丹, 王斯一, 张彩虹, 张兰. 电厂和政府行为策略演化博弈与仿真研究基于农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展视角[J]. 北京林业大学学报(社会科学版), 2024, 23(1): 62-70. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2022172
Yu Dan, Wang Siyi, Zhang Caihong, Zhang Lan. Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Power Plant and Government Behavior Strategy: a Study Based on the Development Perspective of Agricultural and Forestry Biomass Coupled Power Generation Industry[J]. Journal of Beijing Forestry University (Social Science), 2024, 23(1): 62-70. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2022172
Citation: Yu Dan, Wang Siyi, Zhang Caihong, Zhang Lan. Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Power Plant and Government Behavior Strategy: a Study Based on the Development Perspective of Agricultural and Forestry Biomass Coupled Power Generation Industry[J]. Journal of Beijing Forestry University (Social Science), 2024, 23(1): 62-70. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2022172

电厂和政府行为策略演化博弈与仿真研究基于农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展视角

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Power Plant and Government Behavior Strategy: a Study Based on the Development Perspective of Agricultural and Forestry Biomass Coupled Power Generation Industry

  • 摘要: “双碳”背景下,农林生物质与煤耦合发电成为煤电转型的新路径。政府如何制定有效的补贴和监管政策,以及电厂如何进行正确的策略选择是促进农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展的关键。通过构建政府和电厂的混合策略博弈模型,分析双方的博弈关系和行为策略动态演变过程,并运用系统动力学进行建模仿真,进一步探析关键因素对政府和电厂行为策略的影响路径。结果表明:政府和电厂的行为策略在较长时期里无法趋于稳定,而是在相互影响中波动变化。政府制定补贴和监管策略、提高耦合发电收益、降低耦合发电成本,都将促进更多电厂选择农林生物质与煤耦合发电,从而进一步促进产业发展。

     

    Abstract: Under the background of "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality", agricultural and forestry biomass coupled power generation has become a new path of coal power transformation. How the government formulates effective subsidy and supervision policies and how the power plant chooses the right strategy is the key to promoting the development of agricultural and forestry biomass coupled power generation industry. In this paper, a hybrid strategy game model between the government and the power plant was constructed to analyze the game relationship and the dynamic evolution process of the behavior strategy of both sides. Then, system dynamics was used to conduct modeling and simulation and further explore the influence path of key factors on the behavior strategy of the government and the power plant. The results show that the behavior strategies of the government and power plant are not stable in a long period, but fluctuate in the interaction. At the same time, formulating subsidies and supervision policies by the government, improving the benefits of coupled power generation, and reducing the cost of coupled power generation, will promote more power plants to choose agricultural and forestry biomass coupled power generation, and further promote industrial development.

     

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