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Yu Dan, Wang Siyi, Zhang Caihong, Zhang Lan. Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Power Plant and Government Behavior Strategy: a Study Based on the Development Perspective of Agricultural and Forestry Biomass Coupled Power Generation Industry[J]. Journal of Beijing Forestry University (Social Science), 2024, 23(1): 62-70. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2022172
Citation: Yu Dan, Wang Siyi, Zhang Caihong, Zhang Lan. Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Power Plant and Government Behavior Strategy: a Study Based on the Development Perspective of Agricultural and Forestry Biomass Coupled Power Generation Industry[J]. Journal of Beijing Forestry University (Social Science), 2024, 23(1): 62-70. DOI: 10.13931/j.cnki.bjfuss.2022172

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Power Plant and Government Behavior Strategy: a Study Based on the Development Perspective of Agricultural and Forestry Biomass Coupled Power Generation Industry

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  • Received Date: October 19, 2022
  • Accepted Date: September 09, 2023
  • Available Online: September 11, 2023
  • Under the background of "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality", agricultural and forestry biomass coupled power generation has become a new path of coal power transformation. How the government formulates effective subsidy and supervision policies and how the power plant chooses the right strategy is the key to promoting the development of agricultural and forestry biomass coupled power generation industry. In this paper, a hybrid strategy game model between the government and the power plant was constructed to analyze the game relationship and the dynamic evolution process of the behavior strategy of both sides. Then, system dynamics was used to conduct modeling and simulation and further explore the influence path of key factors on the behavior strategy of the government and the power plant. The results show that the behavior strategies of the government and power plant are not stable in a long period, but fluctuate in the interaction. At the same time, formulating subsidies and supervision policies by the government, improving the benefits of coupled power generation, and reducing the cost of coupled power generation, will promote more power plants to choose agricultural and forestry biomass coupled power generation, and further promote industrial development.

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